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The experience of American investors in foreign bonds has been
brief but instructive. Of the five billions of the dollar bonds of for-
eign governments floated in the United States between 1920 and 1931,
almost a third, mainly of Latin-American countries, is in total or partial
default. Unfortunately, among the Latin-American countries the de-
fault ratio is approximately 76 per cent. These bonds are said to have
been in the hands of nearly 700,000 investors.
The effort to establish how this misfortune occurred and what
measures have been taken or can be taken to protect the interests of the
bondholders, engaged the attention of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which under the direction of the Protective Committee
Study, headed by Commissioner William 0. Douglas, has submitted to
Congress an exhaustive report presenting some of the testimony, the
findings, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission.
Considering the peculiar difficulty of the task, the number of people that
had to be examined, and the intricacy of the subjectmatter, the results
achieved deserve the highest commendation. The systematic presenta-
tion of so vast a body of material in an intelligible form and the perspi-
cacity and practicality with which the investigation was pursued, reflect
credit on the investigators.
The Committee confined itself in the main to investigating the fate,
from origination to default and subsequent effort at rehabilitation, of the
recent bond issues of Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Salvador, Peru and Guate-
mala. The private protective committees for the bondholders which were
organized by private entrepreneurs, lawyers or issuing bankers receive
central attention, for it is the abuses incidental to such committees which
lead the Commission to its recommendations for reform. The investi-
gators undertook to examine not only the operations of the private pro-
tective committees but the experiences of the successful British Council
of Foreign Bondholders, organized in 1868. That led them into a de-
tailed examination of the short experience of the recently organized
(American) Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, which, the Con-
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mittee finally concludes, after considering several alternatives, constitutes
the best protection for the American bondholder. The Committee also
heard disinterested experts familiar with the law and practice of rescu-
ing and readjusting foreign bond defaults. They also considered the
functions of the Department of State in case of a foreign default and
how that interest, in the light of all its implications, might most appropri-
ately be manifested.
Thus the Committee took into consideration all aspects of the prob-
lem, public and private, with a view to recommending an elimination of
the evils disclosed, better protection for the legitimate interests of the
bondholder and the limitation of the responsibility of the Department
of State.
The investigators soon established that the legal remedies of the
holder of a defaulted foreign bond either in the country of issue or in
the creditor or debtor country, are trifling, and that even governmental
assistance in the form of economic sanctions or armed force is hardly
feasible.' Even diplomatic representation is as a rule limited to the em-
ployment of good offices for private adjustments, for the Government
of the creditors is hardly in a position to intervene actively in the ne-
gotiation of a settlement or readjustment. That happens only when po-
litical interests are at stake. The readjustment thus as a rule comes
down to a negotiation between private creditors and public debtors in
which the debtor Government has at stake the restoration of its reputa-
tion for probity, its good faith, and the necessity of mdintaining its credit
for future needs, whereas the creditor has at stake the formulation of a
plan which will assure him the best possible return consistent with the
capacity of the debtor country to pay. A foreign governmental default
and a domestic bankruptcy thus differ in material respects, for in spite
of protective clauses, which the investigators do not examine at length,
the creditor cannot obtain or distribute the assets of his debtor, but
must accept the fact that the debtor country must be given full oppor-
tunity to continue to function and that it is to his interest to restore the
debtor to the best possible financial condition in order that he may be
in a position to discharge the readjusted obligation.
The British experience naturally impresses the Commission
strongly. The Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, with
but little governmental support, has earned a high reputation for disin-
terested service to both creditor and debtor which deservedly may be
1 In the Dexter and Carpenter case (p. 14) while the Court could not issue a
write of execution against Sweden, the Ddpartment of State did recover, diplomat-
ically, $150,000. Press Releases, No. 210, p. 199.
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emulated by the youthful American Council. The British Corporation,
* organized under Act of Parliament, consists of twenty-one members ap-
pointed in part by the British Bankers Association, by the London
Chamber of Commerce, and by the Council of the Corporation. Those
appointed by the Council, nine in number, must be bona fide holders of
foreign bonds to the amount of £5,000. The British organization is
fortunate in having capital assets of its own of nearly £200,000. It is
financed by the income from these funds and by fees paid by defaulting
governments on reorganization and, on occasion, by assisted bondhold-
ers. The American Council came into operation only after it was found
that the government Corporation of Foreign Security Holders projected
by Title II of the Securities Act of 1933, could not be effectively brought
into operation because, presumably, it would have been too closely as-
sociated with the federal government. In the original plan the R. F. C.
was to finance it by a loan of $75,000. The Department of State, de-
ciding that private persons had better organize the Protective Council,
invited the organizing members to meet under its auspices, whereupon
a private corporation was formed with directors, officers, an executive
committee, and contributors. The fact that these contributors were in
large part banks of issue, of whose disinterestedness the Commission is
not convinced, has led to the recommendations, to be mentioned below,
of a different method of financial support. The American Council has
as yet no capital assets.
The principal result of the investigation was to expose the inade-
quacies of the bondholders' protection through the privately promoted or
self-constituted protective committee. Here, especially in the Salvador,
Cuban, and Chilean loans, the investigators disclosed a number of evils
common to this form of organization. Such committees have certain
defensible motives in that they do furnish an opportunity for a common
front and explore the possibilities not merely of settlements with the
defaulting country but of law suits for misrepresentation against the is-
suing bankers of the loan. While the investigators appreciated the im-
portance of the private committees' interest and usefulness in holding is-
suing bankers to their legal responsibilities, they do not have a high
opinion of the negotiating powers of such self-constituted or independ-
ent committees and point out various weaknesses which tend materially
to limit their value. Among these are the following: that the motive of
personal profit seems to predominate among at least some of the self-
constituted protective committees and that their methods of forcing the
bondholder to accept the results of their work and to pay fees even be-
yond those originally represented are subject to grave criticism. The
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investigators note the custom of using prominent names for decoration
and the zealousness of lawyers and issuing bankers to obtain control
of such committees, not always with an exclusive eye to the benefit of
the bondholder. In the latter respect the investigators conclude that the
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, even when sponsoring the or-
ganization of protective committees, as in the case of Cuba and Chile,
is better equipped to protect the interests of the bondholder.
The investigators deal at some length with the methods employed by
private protective committees, such as publicity, solicitation of deposits
on a commission basis, and pressure devices on the bondholder. The
evils of competing committees for the same defaults are pointed out.
Only in the case of El Salvador, where the protective committee's ex-
penses and demands on the bondholder were deemed excessive,2 is there
a detailed presentation of the morphology of a bond default from orig-
inal issue to readjustment, the finality of which can rarely be definitely
predicted.
Considerable space is given to the role of the Department of State
in the process-its actual role in extending its good offices to encourage
a private settlement, and what might be its policy in cooperation with
the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council so as to relieve the De-
partment of administrative and political burdens as between the bond-
holder and the defaulting country.
In the ordinary default based on good faith and inability to pay,
the Department's role, conforming in this respect with international
law, is necessarily minor and mostly negative. Military intervention or
economic sanctions are out of the question. In its policy toward Santo
Domingo, Haiti and Nicaragua, the Department's interest had to be
more active, not for the sake of the bondholders but because at least in
Santo Domingo and Nicaragua, financially impecunious administrations
had to be helped on their feet, and American bankers were solicited to
aid the embarrassed country. Necessarily in such cases the Department
had to assume a larger share of responsibility for the correct use of the
money loaned and for assuring some degree of reliability in the methods
agreed upon for liquidation of the debt. It is in connection with cases of
bad faith or in consenting to arbitrate differences that the Department's
role becomes more prominent. Where in bad faith there is a diversion
of pledged revenues, as in Guatemala, or there is discrimination between
American and foreign bondholders, as in the recent case of Germany,
the Department is likely to display more active intervention and is justi-
fied therein by legal precedents.
'Cf. the Salvador committees practices, p. 345.
HeinOnline  -- 38 Colum. L. Rev. 379 1938
380 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
0
The investigators discovered the relative weakness of some of the
supposed protective clauses in bonds which one of the attorneys who
writes such bonds frankly conceded to be "boiler plate." A covenant to
devote special revenues to the discharge of a loan is no more compulsory
than the original agreement to service the loan and repay it. But the
actual experience with bond issues does not lead to the conclusion that
security clauses are without value. They have often served on reor-
ganization to obtain priority for the bondholders particularly affected, as
in the case of Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Santo Domingo and
Mexico. A readjustment has sometimes worked out as planned and at
other times has not. Where countries are exposed to political upheavals
and the administration is unstable, the value of a promise to pay is neces-
sarily somewhat under par. Perhaps the rate of interest that issuing
bankers exact from borrowing countries is as accurate an index as any
other of the probabilities of an uninterrupted discharge of the obligation.
Pledges of revenues have not much value unless the agents of the credi-
tors are actually placed by the borrowing country in a position to receive
and distribute the revenues and enjoy the protection of the creditor gov-
ernment in preventing any modification of the arrangement by the
debtor. In this connection it must also be observed that the defaults of
recent years, as the investigators point out, are due in part to a general
depreciation of the obligation of contract, to the example of the large-
scale defaults of the war loans by some of the most powerful govern-
ments, and after 1931, to the difficulties of transfer. Indeed, a consid-
erable number of the defaulters of recent years have been able to make
their payments in local currency, but because of trade and exchange de-
terioration have been unable to transfer local currency into creditors'
currency.
The investigators take occasion to challenge debtor countries such
as Chile and Guatemala for practices inimical to the legitimate interests
of the bondholders. The unilateral plans presented by Chile and Guate-
mala met with the disapproval of the investigators as they did of the
bondholders, as inadequate offers not commensurate with the debtor's
ability to pay. The Committee is critical of the advantage taken by
defaulting governments in failing to supply funds for the discharge
of interest while employing such funds to repatriate the depreciated
bonds at the low prices which the default itself has brought about. The
Committee is also critical of the fact that short-term creditors are able
to obtain for themselves a priority over the long-term bondholders, as in
the case of Chile, because these creditors are in a position to deny the
defaulting country the funds for current needs. The advantage is thus
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due to a preferential bargaining position rather than to any legal pri-
ority. In this connection as in others the Committee emphasizes the
necessity of avoiding conflicts of interest among creditor's and debtor's
representatives and among creditors, and for that reason criticizes a law
firm which drew the bond contract, presumably in the interests of bank-
ers and bondholders, and then on default represented the defaulting gov-
ernment. They also object to short-term creditors representing in any
way the long-term bondholders, for their interests are conflicting.
In a final section appraising existing agencies for the protection of
bondholders, the Committee assesses the respective advantages and dis-
advantages of banker protective committees, independent committees,
and the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council. The advantages of
the Council are the savings in cost, the advantage of centralization and
continuity, the friendly relations with and cooperation of the Depart-
ment of State, the ability to exercise a degree of statesmanship by tak-
ing into account the interests of the defaulting country as well as of
the bondholders, and its opportunity to relieve the Department of State
of responsibilities which it either should not have or has been compelled
to assume for lack of other agency. The Committee agrees that the
original public protective corporation planned under the Securities Act
of 1933 was too closely identified with the Government for the best in-
terests of all concerned. To be sure, the experience of the Council is as
yet too short to be conclusive, for some of its principal activities have
been confined to negotiating transfers and preventing discriminations
against American bondholders. In complicated cases, as in Cuba, the
Council sponsored the organization of a committee largely to forestall
a private protective committee.
The Committee deals also with the criticisms that have been made of
the Council, for example, that it has failed to take prompt action, that its
plan of readjustment was not good, that it has failed to cooperate with
independent committees, that it does not legally, represent the bond-
holders, and that its financing brings about closer affiliation with issuing
bankers and short-term creditors than. objective disinterestedness would
require. Only the last criticism is seriously supported by the investi-
gating committee, while admitting that to a limited extent on occasion
other criticisms may have been justified. The Committee opposed figure-
heads acting as directors of the Council. It discountenances affiliation of
the Council with issuing bankers or fiscal agents. At all times, the
Committee is concerned to have the Council serve "as a disinterested
agency free from entangling alliances with those who would pervert the
readjustment process to their own ends."
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On the whole, however, the Committee concludes that the Council
is the best protector for the bondholders and that while it cannot well
enforce the bondholders' claims against bankers for rescission and fraud,
this function can readily be performed by privately organized committees
if they so desire; that there is therefore still a place left for such private
committees, which must now register with the S. E. C. The Council
failed, the Committee finds, to take aggressive steps to prevent the pref-
erential treatment of short-term creditors in the Chilean and Colombian
defaults, and feels that the private committees may aid in insuring that
such preference is not accorded. The preference however is due to
economic advantage, and is not easy to prevent by admonition. The
Council's inability to prevent the Chilean and Colombian preference was,
the committee finds, due to inadequate facilities and resources. It is
in this connection that the Committee makes its principal recommenda-
tion to the effect that the Council should be strengthened and that its
resoutces should be augmented. It suggests capital funds for the Coun-
cil either from a private foundation or as a loan from the Government.
Just on what grounds a private foundation should finance an economic
agency created for the protection of bondholders is not readily perceived.
The Council could only repay loans to the Government by obtaining
fees from the defaulting government, as is the British practice, or from
the bondholders. There seems no reason why in this way the Council
should not be able to acquire that financial independence which the Com-
mittee considers indispensable to the most efficient performance of its
functions. It suggests a reorganization of the administration of the
Council by dropping figureheads and centralizing responsibility in a
small committee with consultants to be approached as occasion requires.
Representation by houses of issue, fiscal agents, or short-term creditors
on the Council is strenuously opposed. Measures are recommended to
curb the repatriation of foreign bonds by debtor countries.
On July 22, 1937, a Board of Visitors was established by the Sec-
retary of State and the Chairman of the S. E. C. to inspect from time to
time the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council and to examine its
internal financial operations, its expenses and disbursements, including
requests by the Council for fees from foreign countries and from Ameri-
can bondholders in connection with debt readjustments, as well as other
sources of income.
The Report as a whole constitutes a valuable exposure of certain
evils which have accrued in connection with foreign bond financing and
reorganization and a constructive recommendation of certain necessary
improvements in the practice. The Report cannot fail to have its effects
HeinOnline  -- 38 Colum. L. Rev. 382 1938
BOOK REVIEWS
in diminishing the evils of the private protective committee, while yet
affording it a certain sphere of activity. It will probably also strengthen
the power and prestige of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council,
for it brings into the open all the factors and influences which tend both
to weaken and to strengthen that body. Whether further legislation will
be required to bring about greater S. E. C. control of private protective
committees or to carry into effect some of the other recommendations
of the Committee remains to be seen. At all events, the holders of de-
faulted foreign bonds should henceforth enjoy better and cheaper pro-
tection than they have had heretofore.
EDWIN BORCHARD*
Yale Law School.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW. By Eu-
GEN EHRLICH. Cambridge: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1936. pp.
xxxvi, 541.
When this book first appeared in 1912 the phrase "living law" sug-
gested a concept that would overturn the foundations of our jurispru-
dence, but the world went on after its publication in its erratic way
with its war and post-war problems. The translation into English after
twenty-five years revives the memories of its first appearance and sug-
gests a reconsideration of the author's theories.
Briefly, the thesis is that "The whole economic and social order of
the human race is based upon the following small number of facts: us-
age, domination, possession, disposition (usually by contract or by testa-
mentary disposition)." (p. 118.) The law is to be found not in the
statutes (except for state law in the narrow sense, taxation, administra-
tion, etc.) nor for the most part in the judicial decisions which represent
the exceptional and often the bizarre case but in the rules which people
actually observe, actually live under and live by. This law is to be found
in the legal documents people employ and above all in the direct observa-
tion of life, commerce, custom, usages, associations.
To range states of fact under established legal concepts is a fatal
error. This is the juristic mathematics of concepts. "A playground for
bloodless abstractions that scarcely touch the earth with their toes."
The author points out, however, that the system of concepts is not in
practice as ridiculous as its statement would make it seem, for the legal
propositions are created by jurists preponderantly on the basis of norms
found in the judgment of courts and when applied as the legal proposi-
tions of the Roman law were applied'to a state 6f society vastly different,
unconsciously the existing state of society was included in the legal prop-
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